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Policy issues in Maine school finance reform
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 3

by Jean E. Lavigne and
Patricia Hofmaster
Introduction
Financing public education has been a matter of contentious debate nationally since the 1970s.
Maine has been an active participant in the education reform movement. The School Finance Act
of 1985 moved Maine to the forefront of educational reform, and was recognized nationally as an
innovative piece of legislation. Severe budget stress, however, culminated in the suspension of
the Act’s school finance formula in 1990. In July of 1992, Governor McKernan, in response to
widespread dissatisfaction with the method of financing public education, established the
Governor’s Task Force to Provide Recommendations Regarding School Funding Issues, the fifth
such commission formed since 1987.
The Task Force was to make recommendations that would improve the quality of education and
that would improve both taxpayer and student equity within the state of Maine. The stakes in this
effort are high. There are approximately 214,000 children in public schools in Maine. Their
future, and ultimately that of Maine, depends in large part on the quality of education they
receive. Amid much anticipation, the Task Force presented its final report on November 29,
1993.
This article focuses on issues associated with Maine’s primary and secondary school finance
formulas, but the answers to the problems associated with public education lie not solely in
reforming the state’s school finance formula. Rather, the answers lie in creating and supporting
an expanded vision of educational finance, one that uses state subsidies to create the incentives
necessary to transform schools. School finance formulas provide the basis for educational
reform, most of which is impossible without state financial assistance. The purpose of this article
is to provide an aid in rethinking the policy parameters of Maine’s school finance formula
reform. It includes background on Maine’s school finance, how primary and secondary public
education is funded, a review on how to evaluate a school finance formula, strategies that are
utilized when revenues fall short, a critique of the highlights of the Governor’s Task Force’s
report, and recommendations for future reform.
Background
The basic structure of Maine’s current school finance formula dates back to a 1970s national
reform movement, in which states addressed concerns about unequal educational opportunities
between students in rich and poor communities and about unequal tax burdens across the state.
The School Finance Act of 1985 ("The Act"), which was a direct result of these concerns, did not
change the property tax equalization element of the school finance formula. A local community’s

share of local education expenses remains based on a statewide mill rate that is combined with a
state subsidy. The subsidy pays for the difference between the subsidizable expenditures and the
amount raised in each school district by the state-established mill rate (Rydell & Kiermaier
1987).
The Act, however, did depart from previous school finance reform in several significant ways. It
strengthened the public accountability for schools by establishing statewide student assessment
tests. In other words, standardized tests were introduced across the state as a way to measure the
success of schools in providing an adequate level of education to Maine’s children. Furthermore,
the Act increased standards for schools, teachers, and students. Students faced increased
graduation requirements in the areas of science, mathematics, social studies, and fine arts.
Teacher certification procedures were strengthened and schools were to face more stringent
accreditation and approval standards. The Act correctly linked financial reform with educational
reform.
In addition, the Act changed the school aid formula to correct for deficiencies in three major
areas. First, it addressed the under-funding of schools caused by exclusion of some expenditures
of high-spending school districts from the statewide average expenditures, which had resulted in
lower subsidizable costs for all school districts. The Act changed this aspect by including all
expenditures, which thereby made the average subsidy more reflective of true expenditures.
Secondly, it set a per-student expenditure average for the state. Previously, districts spending less
than the state average had their state subsidies calculated on the basis of past per-student average.
This made it nearly impossible for districts below the state average to attain the state average, as
small increases in a school district’s budget lead to a large increase in its tax rate. Finally, the Act
added an inflation adjustment to categorical expenditures. The old formula had an inflation
adjustment for regular education costs but not for special education, vocational education, or
transportation.
Funding for general purpose school aid increased substantially (32 percent) from 1985 to 1989.
Policymakers expected that, as the state added more funds to education, the state’s share of the
cost for public education would increase and the reliance on local revenues (e.g. property taxes)
would decrease. This, however, did not occur. In 1980, the state financed 42.8 percent of total
elementary and secondary public education expenses (LaPlante 1993). By 1990, after several
years of reform and average annual state subsidy increases of eight percent during 1980-1986,
and of 17 percent between 1986-1990, the state’s share had increased only slightly, to 43.4
percent. This relatively steady state share, despite substantial increases in the state dollars spent
on public education, is a result of the increased demands put on public schools.
Maine has been typical of the rest of the nation in terms of the proportion of public education
costs paid by the state. Nationally, state governments averaged 48.3 percent of elementary and
secondary public education costs in 1990-1991, with 45.5 percent from local governments, and
6.2 percent from the federal government (Gold et. al. 1992). The state and local share of revenue
do vary considerably across the states. For instance, the local share varies from 89.8 percent in
New Hampshire to 0.1 percent in Hawaii. Usually, state governments provide between 40
percent and 70 percent of non-federal funding.

Revenues for public education
Property taxes continue to play a central role in the financing of education, not only as a way to
finance the local communities’ share of costs, but also as a way to determine the state’s share for
individual communities. For local governments in Maine, there is no revenue alternative to the
property tax. Any discussion about shedding costs from the state to local governments, therefore,
implies that local revenues must be increased and must lead to increases in property taxes.
Nationally, in the past six years there has been a movement away from property valuation as the
only measure of a school district's ability to pay (Gold et. al. 1992). The methods of generating
revenues can be broadly categorized as wealth, income, consumption, and privilege.
Wealth: A tax on wealth is based on the ownership of property. The most common example is
the property tax, which is based on the amount of property owned. It bears no relationship to the
income generated by it.
Income: A tax on income is based on the taxable income of individuals and/or corporations. The
amount of the tax is related to the income used to pay for it.
Consumption: A tax on consumption is based upon purchases (e.g. the sales tax). If a tax applies
only to the purchase of a particular class of items it is called an excise tax. Lottery revenues fall
into this category.
Privilege: A tax on privilege is a tax levied on the right to engage is some sort of conduct
regulated by government. It usually takes the form of license fees. Franchises and concessions
are included in this category.
A tax system relying on all bases is generally preferable, as individuals who manage their affairs
in such a way as to minimize one tax will be covered by another. Educational finance rests
primarily on broad-based taxes such as income, consumption and wealth. Some states, however,
have earmarked taxes especially for primary and secondary public education.
Twenty-eight states have dedicated a particular tax to education, but these narrow-based tax
sources have been found insufficient to meet the funding needs of public education (Gold et. al.
1992). The taxes most frequently earmarked were general sales tax (11 states), severance tax (7
states), and tobacco tax (7 states). Other taxes earmarked are those on alcoholic beverages (4
states), personal income (4 states), public utilities (4 states), property (5 states), corporate income
(4 states), and insurance premiums (4 states). In addition, 12 states have earmarked lottery
revenue for education. National experience has proven that earmarking is often helpful to schools
initially, but once in effect for several years it does little to increase the total state revenues
generated for primary and secondary public education.
The central role that property taxes play in local community efforts to generate the revenues for
primary and secondary public education is problematic both on a student and a taxpayer level.
The wealth of a community (as defined by the assessed value of property) is a determining factor
in the expenditures per student made by a community. Communities with relatively high

property values can raise significant revenues for education with below average tax rates.
Communities with relatively low property values must use above average tax rates to raise
comparable revenues. While this is a problem in every state, it's particularly problematic in
Maine, as local communities have no alternative to the property tax to fund their public schools.
Evaluating school finance formulas
1. Berne and Stiefel (1984) developed a model for analyzing the school finance equity
concepts that is organized around four main questions:
2. Who? For what group should school finance systems be equitable?
3. What? What objects should be distributed fairly?
4. How? What principles should be used to determine whether a particular distribution is
equitable?
5. How much? What quantitative measures should be used to assess the degree of equity?
The first, and most critical, question addresses who will be the object of the equity: Students or
taxpayers. The second question asks what is it that one wants to have distributed fairly. In the
case of students, the choices are inputs, outputs, outcomes, and processes. Inputs refer to
expenditures per student or to physical resources. Educational expenditures reflect the cost of
educational policies, such as teacher salaries, average class size, the availability of special
services, and the rate of participation in education by the population. If communities encounter
price differentials for inputs, the cost may not be an accurate measure of equity. Cost indexes
have been used to address this concern. Physical resources, such as teacher characteristics,
facilities, equipment and educational materials, provide an alternative to dollar inputs. It is
difficult, however, to create a comprehensive rating of sameness/fairness in physical resources
due to the lack of comparability between differing resources.
A third alternative would be to equalize the outputs of education. Outputs are the direct results of
the schooling process. They are represented by students’ cognitive achievements, improved
manual skills, and other measures of student behavior. Inputs, however, are cumulative and nonexclusive, as children learn from teachers, family members, friends, the media, and other
influences in their lives. Since we cannot control for all the influences in students’ lives, it is
difficult to measure the effects of schooling.
Another choice would be outcomes, which include the employment, earning, status, and
attitudinal and behavioral changes of students. While conceptually it would be very desirable to
link students’ school experiences with their after-school outcomes, the effect of non-school
experiences and student choices make such an endeavor very difficult. External influences, such
as the conditions of labor markets and other events that shape students' attitudes and behavior, all
have effects on student outcomes.
The final choice, processes, refers to educational program and instructional quality equity. While
there may not be sufficient resources for all students to participate in a particular program, if the
chance of gaining access to a program is equal among students, the process can be viewed as
fair. Specific cases in which the equity of processes are evaluated are often decided in court.

The third question of the Berne-Stiefel model for equity in school finance asks what principles
are employed to determine equity. There are three principles applied to school finance research:
horizontal equity, vertical equity and equal opportunity. The underlying presumption in the
horizontal equity principle is that children in the same circumstances should be treated equally.
The vertical equity principle recognizes that children are different and, therefore, that unequal
treatment that reflects those differences is required. The third equity principle, equal opportunity,
is defined as: "there should not be differences according to the characteristics that are considered
illegitimate, such as property wealth per pupil, household income, fiscal capacity, or sex" (Berne
and Stiefel 1984, p. 17).
The last question addresses how much equity exists and how that equity is to be measured. The
type of equity will determine the measure to gauge it. For instance, horizontal equity is not
measured the same way vertical equity or equal opportunity is measured. Knowing how much
equity does or does not exists is integral to evaluating a school finance formula’s effectiveness in
meeting the stated objectives of the legislation which created it.
This model is helpful when evaluating school finance formulas, because it clearly identifies:
Who is to be the focus of equity concerns, what specifically needs to be distributed equitably,
what principles underlay the concerns for equity, and how it is going to be measured. A school
finance formula is not simply a matter of how much a community is going to be assisted in its
primary and secondary public school funding by the state. A school finance formula
encompasses a much broader and deeper range of values, principles, and concerns, and it has
implications that directly effect students, taxpayers, communities, states, and the nation as a
whole. Keeping this in mind, we briefly describe strategies used to address equity concerns and
then turn our attention to a closer look at the school finance formula utilized by the state of
Maine.
Strategies addressing equity concerns in school finance formulas
Two approaches that achieve more equity in school finance, or that close the gap between high
spending and low spending districts, have been utilized. The first, "leveling up," raises the level
of revenues in the districts with the least revenue to spend on education to that of districts with
greater revenues. The second method, "leveling down," caps spending for the wealthiest districts
or recaptures revenue from wealthy districts and redistributes it into poorer districts.
When a state faces budget problems, however, neither of these approaches are usually utilized.
Rather, states tend to make ad hoc adjustments to existing formulas. Strategies that address the
issue of funding cuts in relation to education can be categorized as equalizing or disequalizing.
Equalizing strategies include: cutting state aid based on ability to pay, sharing the costs of
programs, or consolidating or terminating programs.
In the first equalizing strategy, the state reduces the share of state aid in proportion to the ability
of the local district to pay for it. Therefore, districts that receive a high percentage of state
funding for their total costs would receive a smaller percentage reduction in aid than districts that
receive a lower percentage of their expenditures from the state. This is the same concept as a
graduated tax structure.

The second equalizing strategy, sharing costs of a program, requires local communities to share
the costs of a particular program based on their ability to pay. In most states, this would include
transportation and teacher retirement costs. The ability to pay would be determined by whatever
the measure of wealth is employed in the school finance formula. The third equalizing strategy,
consolidating or term-inating programs, eliminates programs that disequalize resources among
districts. These include "hold harmless provisions," ineffective categorical programs, and
minimum aid programs. The funds from these disequalizing programs can then be distributed in
an equalizing state aid formula.
Disequalizing strategies used by states include freezing state aid and implementing across-theboard reductions in state aid. When states freeze the state aid at current year level, it is
disequalizing as it causes poorer districts to suffer more from inflation and loss of buying power
than wealthier districts. When states implement across-the-board reductions in state aid, poorer
districts, which receive a larger percentage of their education revenue from the state, face larger
cutbacks than wealthier districts. The districts that are least able to absorb revenue cuts,
therefore, receive the largest ones.
In 1991, with state revenues decreasing and a severe budget deficit, Maine’s fiscally strapped
legislature suspended the school aid formula enacted in the School Finance Act of 1985. The
state, faced with cutting state subsidies, chose a disequalizing method, an across-the-board
reduction that cut all districts’ state subsidies by five percent. The following year a ten percent
across-the-board reduction in state subsidies occurred. This undermined the intent of the Act to
ensure equity in the primary and secondary public education system. Under a five or ten percent
cut in state funding, communities that rely more heavily on state funding suffered considerably
more than communities that rely comparatively less on state funding.
For example, in the case of a ten percent reduction in state subsidy, if Community A schools 100
students, receives 70 percent of its public school budget from the state and has a budget of
$500,000, the state subsidy for community A would be $350,000. A ten percent reduction in
state subsidy would cut $35,000. If Community B has the same number of students and the same
budget, but receives 45 percent of its public school funding through state subsidy, Community B
would receive $225,000 from the state, and a ten percent reduction would reduce their state
subsidy by $22,500. Community A, the poorer district initially, therefore, realizes the greater loss
of state aid.
Other problems make the current school finance formula in Maine inequitable, and, therefore,
unsatisfactory. For example, just as the aid formula was suspended, property values in the
southern part of the state decreased relative to values throughout the state. If the original formula
had been in effect when this relative decrease occurred, it is widely believed that subsidies would
have increased to those areas. Instead, they decreased at the same time the ability of communities
to raise revenues was constrained, which caused them to have less ability to mitigate the damage
caused by cuts in state funding.

Highlights of the Governor’s Task Force Recommendations
We now turn our attention to the latest evaluation of Maine’s school funding issues, "Initial
School Funding Recommendations, the Final Report of the Governor’s Task Force to Provide
Recommendations Regarding School Funding Issues." Although comprehensive in its approach,
it does not, as many had hoped, provide any easy answers to the problem of achieving equity in
the midst of major state fiscal distress. Its highlights are reviewed and critiqued below.
Fund essential programs and essential services
The task force should be lauded for its most sensible and revolutionary recommendation: To
create a funding plan that is based on fully funding essential programs and essential services.
This is the most important recommendation offered by the Task Force because it clearly supports
an avenue to attaining student equity. It grew out of concern over the lack of fairness in the
impact of state funding on students as well as taxpayers. In some communities, programs and
classrooms were eliminated, while other communities had the ability to increase local taxes in
order to compensate for the loss of revenue from state aid. The past emphasis on equalizing the
expenditures per student per district does not ensure equal access to programs, curriculums, and
other educational resources within schools.
The recommendation to fully fund essential programs and services must not be interpreted as a
call for guaranteeing a minimum standard. A minimum education will not serve the children of
Maine well. The Task Force clearly calls for essential services, not minimums. The potential
exists under the proposed system to have different service levels depending upon the amount a
community is willing and able to fund beyond the essential services. If local contributions
continue to be based on the assessed value of property, high wealth districts, especially those
with low service demands, will continue be able to raise funds easier than low wealth districts.
Shift employer’s share of retirement contribution to local districts
This recommendation will generate the most controversy. It calls for shifting some of the costs of
the employee retirement fund to local districts. Currently, 100 percent of employee retirement
costs are paid by the state, regardless of a local government’s ability to pay. It is not considered
equitable, as local governments vary considerably across the state in terms of ability to
contribute. The growth of costs associated with retirement systems has placed a burden on the
state. In 1980, employees’ retirement received 13.5 percent of all state education expenditures; in
1990, it received 20 percent (LaPlante 1993). Since the state pays all retirement costs, this
increase placed a burden on state obligations at the same time that the total state allocation to
public education was being reduced. Therefore, even less state aid was available to distribute
among local communities.
The greatest danger inherent in this recommendation is that the focus of debate will be whether
or not local communities are able to or should, take on some of the costs of the school employee
retirement system. In truth, the implications involved in this recommended change are much
broader. Shifting some cost to local communities implies that a shift in responsibility would
occur. If the minimum state subsidy is abolished, some communities would receive no state

funding. If they were then also required to contribute to their school employee retirement system,
those communities may choose (or win the right) to have a voice in the choice of retirement
system and/or the administration of the current system. This, in turn, could endanger the state
retirement system.
Additionally, the retirement system cannot currently be a point of negotiation between local
school employees and the local communities. If local communities were to fund, even in part, the
retirement system, it could become a point of negotiation, which would likely result in both lack
of equity in retirement policies for public school employees and increase the costs of
administering retirement systems.
Add hardship adjustment factor to formula
This recommendation would include an adjustment to the assessed property valuation that would
incorporate factors related to income in the formula. The index was developed by Dr. Josephine
LaPlante (University of Southern Maine) for the Task Force. The three factors identified in the
index are: high poverty rates of the municipality, high property tax rates for education in relation
to median income, and high housing costs in relation to median income. They are combined into
a composite "Index of Fiscal Hardship." This measure provides an innovative approach to the
current practice of complete reliance on the assessed value of a community as a wealth measure
to determine the state subsidy for education. Unfortunately, it also creates a new set of problems.
First, there is a difficulty associated with the unit of analysis of the adjustment. In the index of
fiscal hardship, the unit of analysis is the community, not individual taxpayers or students. This
would result in yet another tradeoff in an already difficult balance between taxpayer and student
equity. A community with the highest rating on the fiscal hardship index would receive a
maximum reduction of ten percent of its assessed property valuation, and would therefore be
guaranteed a larger state subsidy. This reduction of assessed property value would benefit each
property taxpayer in the community, regardless of their ability to pay. Likewise, low income
property owners in communities with low ratings on the fiscal hardship index would receive no
relief (unless they met circuit breaker criteria and that program was adequately funded). And, as
we know, there is great variation among property owners in terms of property values and ability
to pay taxes.
In addition, the hardship indicator only takes into consideration the amount of property taxes for
education. The Task Force acknowledges that some municipalities act as regional centers, which
may cause municipal overburden, and calls for Maine’s revenue sharing program to address the
issue of municipal overburden in municipalities that serve as regional centers. Given that
acknowledgment, it seems inappropriate not to adjust the assessed property valuation in the
school finance formula.
The Task Force recommends that increased subsidies to school units from adjustments due to the
fiscal hardship index should not come from redistributing the pre-adjustment state appropriation.
Rather, it states that funding should come from savings achieved through implementing other
recommendations or from an additional state appropriation. But some trade-off is inevitable,

because new funding for community relief would come at the expense of categorical funds for
school programs, which vary widely throughout the state.
Initiate a minimum property tax
Although the Task Force members did not reach agreement over the implementation details of a
minimum tax effort, they did agree that all property taxpayers should be required to contribute
some minimum tax effort to funding primary and secondary public education. Within Maine,
there continues to be significant disparities in tax efforts required by local communities to fund
their schools. They have varied widely, from one to 24 mills. Districts with high property values
can raise sufficient revenues to finance schools with a low mill rate. Currently, each school
district is responsible for its own students. There is no method to redistribute funds between
districts, so that all students in the state receive benefits from the overall wealth of the state (as
measured by assessed property values).
The benefit of this recommendation is questionable. First, almost all communities now pay a
local option. Unless the minimum tax is higher than what is already paid by local communities, it
would not make a noticeable difference. Furthermore, it does not seem politically feasible to
redistribute funds to another community due to a 1976 statewide referendum that repealed any
"pay in" provision of the 1973 School Finance Act. At the time of its repeal, citizens were
concerned that their taxes were funding schools that did not use resources as frugally as schools
within their own districts. There were no controls to ensure that the "pay in" method would have
equalized a basic level of education for all of Maine’s children.
Abolish the minimum state subsidy
This recommendation calls for elimination of the minimum state subsidy of five percent. This
would increase student and taxpayer equity by allocating state funds more equitably to
communities where resources are most needed. Currently, this is constrained by the minimum
subsidy of five percent for each district, which is not based on need.
Increase state share to 60 percent
The Task Force recommends that the state share of public and secondary public education be
targeted at 60 percent. It is difficult to judge the likely effect of implementing this
recommendation, given the experience of the 1980s, when state funding increased significantly
but the overall share of state funding remained almost constant. What really matters to local
communities is the cost and quality of education. Without controlling the cost of education, it
appears that there is no way to evaluate the potential of this recommendation to decrease the
costs to local communities. For even if the state’s share of the subsidy were 60 percent, local
communities might have a difficult time raising their 40 percent share of costs if the total cost
per student increased substantially.

Suggestions for future reform in Maine’s school financing formula
The traditional ideas of school finance must be reconceptualized if students are to be given their
best chance to succeed in the twenty-first century and taxpayers are to be treated fairly.
Historically, school finance reforms have almost always coincided with the availability of
surplus funds that allow states to increase expenditures in low-spending districts without
recapturing funds from high-spending districts. When resources for education are scarce, reform
is more difficult and less frequent. As daunting as the challenge is given Maine’s current budget
difficulties, school finance reform must take place, because widespread dissatisfaction with the
current system exists among communities, taxpayers, students and teachers. The challenge for
the next round of school finance reform should be to build from past reform efforts.
The answers to the problems with school finance lie not solely in the state school finance
formula, but also in an expanded vision of educational finance, one that uses state subsidies to
create the incentives necessary to transform schools. Comprehensive reform is never easy. As the
National Commission on the State and Local Public Service (1993) pointed out, "The temptation
will always be toward tinkering and small-scale adjustment, toward turf protection and politics as
usual." The time has come to heed the advice of that commission, which recognized that true
reform requires changing much more than "tinkering and small scale adjustments."
Equalizing a minimum per student expenditure across the state will not guarantee enhanced
outcomes for Maine’s children. Although the goal appears altruistic, equality does not ensure
equity; in fact, it almost guarantees the lack of equity. Different districts, schools within districts,
and students within schools have different educational needs that require different amounts of
revenue. The current formula does not consider the fixed costs necessary to run a school, which
are independent of the number of students it contains. The current formula is also based on the
assessed value of property per student in a community. So school districts lose funds when
enrollments decrease.
Finally, the Maine state school finance formula is spending-driven, based on actual expenditures,
not on some standard of inputs required nor on resources necessary to provide quality education.
Maine schools have one of the highest per student expenditure rates in the nation (National
Center for Educational Statistics 1991). However, in the largest component of schools costs,
teacher salaries, Maine ranks a surprising 35th, well below the national average. Teacher salaries
do not explain the high cost of education in Maine. Rather, researchers have identified the low
number of students, both within schools and within districts, as a cause of Maine’s relatively
high expenditures per student. In other words, the driving factor is not the teacher salary, it is the
number of teachers necessary due to small class sizes. Furthermore, school districts that cannot
distribute fixed costs over a large number of students are more heavily burdened by those costs.
In addition, even by standards of other rural states, the number of school districts in Maine is
curiously high. The expenses associated with the high number of school districts in Maine has
significantly increased the costs throughout the system.
Maine must combine its funding strategies with reforms in school organization, staffing and
management. This can be accomplished in several ways. Increasing individual school’s

accountability by bringing the management of school funds closer to where they are spent is an
option that should be thoroughly considered. Site-based management is recognized as an integral
component for implementing strategies to improve the performance of public education (Odden
1992). Schools need to be given more control over the distribution of their funds and
concurrently to be made more directly accountable for their responsibilities.
By bringing management closer to home, public school personnel, as well as local communities,
will have programmatic ways to hold their schools accountable. Communities will have more
methods of expressing dissatisfaction than by voting down the local school budget, currently the
most obvious way of doing so. In addition, local communities will be better able to see concrete
benefits of their school funding decisions. Maine could stimulate more site-based management
by administering state funds directly to schools.
Another way to link funding strategies to other reforms is to directly link outcome measures to
school finance formulas. Site-based management strategies to improve individual school
accountability must be combined with real incentives and sanctions that are determined by
school outcomes, i.e. standardized test scores. Instead of focusing on revenue inputs, the state
should provide incentives for producing student outcomes and make these outcomes focus on
individual schools, rather than individual teachers (Odden 1992). School-based incentive plans
foster a sense of community and cooperation among faculty to accomplish school-wide student
performance objectives. To make incentives most effective, they must be coupled with real
sanctions for not performing up to state standards. These sanctions, however, should not be
financial, as this would be shortsighted. Sanctions that are currently used in other states are the
provision of technical assistance. In severe cases, a state can take over a district, dismiss faculty
or administration, or revoke tenure.
Thirdly, we must change the state policy of simply giving a subsidy to school districts and then
leaving the rest of the funding to local communities’ discretion. This policy must be abandoned
in the current economic environment. Local communities should not be given an unfair burden in
raising revenues for their primary and secondary public education. The state cannot expect local
communities to be able to compensate for state subsidy losses, as they are also affected by the
declining economy.
Local governments rely too heavily on property tax to provide educational funding, and this
source is too narrowly based. Maine needs to develop revenue sources for education that do not
rely solely on the wealth of the assessed property value of a community and that disregard other
measures of wealth, which are potential revenue sources. Other forms of taxation are necessary.
This is particularly true in light of the ever-growing role that the state has acquired in managing,
organizing, and regulating public education. If, for instance, the Task Force’s recommendation
about funding essential programs and essential services is enacted, it should follow that the state
should share more responsibility in its enforcement.
State government must pay closer attention to the costs of education, not only in terms of saving
dollars, but equally as important, in terms of equity. The same resource does not cost the same
amount in all parts of the state. For example, teacher salaries vary according to the local labor
markets. Cost indices, formulas that adjust for these types of differences, need to be incorporated

into school finance formulas. A more equitable distribution of available state funds could be
court-ordered early in 1994 when Maine’s Superior Court rules on a suit brought against the state
by the School Funding Litigation Trust (Sheekins 1993).
Finally, success or failure of school finance formula must be measured on the basis of students,
not taxpayers. Taxpayer equity in the financing of public education is important and should not
be ignored. But, even if perfect equity were achieved among communities across the state, tax
monies could still fail to equitably provide Maine’s children with a quality education. Children
are the direct beneficiaries of public education and should be a focus of measuring the success or
failure of Maine’s public education system. The status of children within a state reflects not only
its overall economic and social health, but also the state’s hopes for a better future. By focusing
only on short term taxpayer’s needs, the responsibility for Maine’s future can be easily
abdicated.
None of these suggestions for educational reform, financial or organizational, are possible
without access to data on the current state of affairs in Maine's primary and secondary public
education system. Although the state, through its Department of Education, collects considerable
data on all aspects of its public educational system, it is not readily available to legislators,
academics, or most importantly, the citizens of Maine. Our choices concerning reform options
absolutely require the most accurate and current data available. More research is necessary in
order to form the most viable recommendations as well as to implement them most effectively
and most cost efficiently.
Conclusion
Throughout Maine, the concept of reinventing government has struck a resounding chord.
Nationally, there is a consensus that state and local institutions need to improve dramatically
their capacity as well as their performance if we, as a society, are to meet the challenges of our
rapidly changing economic and social systems (National Commission on the State and Local
Public Service 1993). This call has been especially powerful in the arena of educational reform.
Without significant educational reform, financial as well as organizational, the U.S. will not
continue to successfully compete in the growing global economy.
Every child in Maine has the right to a quality education provided by the public. Reforming the
state’s school finance formula and an expanded vision of education finance are the most
promising ways to assure that this right is realized in a more equitable manner among Maine’s
local communities and the children within them. The state of Maine has been an active
participant in the national school finance reform debate. Our failure thus far to solve the
complicated problems inherent in the primary and secondary public education system should not
be interpreted as an inability ultimately to succeed. By broadening the tax base for raising
revenues, by utilizing equalizing strategies to distribute what funds are available, by basing
future school finance reform on the value of equity, by increasing individual schools’ and
teachers’ accountability for the products of public education, by directly linking school finance
funding to outcome measures, by keeping children as the focus of equity concerns, and by using
research to inform debates about proposed reforms, Maine can succeed as a national leader in
assuring better, more effective primary and secondary public education for all of its children.
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